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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-TRADING
STAMP LEGISLATION
Trading stamp companies have been in operation since the
turn of the century, emerging from the use of premiums by de-
partment stores in the 1880's and 1890's. 1 Their growth parallels
the country's business cycles with the exception of the two world
wars when merchandise was in short supply and stores had no
desire to increase volume.2  The industry has developed several
types of stamp programs, so that today a retailer may either
purchase from independent stamp companies, store-owned plans, or
in conjunction with a co-operative stamp system.8
The typical plan is principally an advertising device which
allows retailers to buy stamps for approximately three-tenths of
a cent each,4 and the consumer to receive one for each ten cents
worth of purchases.5 If the stamps induce a fifteen per cent
increase in volume they will pay their way,6 and in areas where
the stamps are new, stores have gained from thirty to fifty per
cent in volume in less than six months.7  Although stamp satura-
tion tends to prevent desired volume increases, it often requires
non-users in the area to introduce them as a defensive device
merely to prevent a loss of volume."
A recent survey reported that seventy-five per cent of American
families saved trading stamps, receiving 275 billion stamps from
thirty-two billion dollars of purchases, which is fifteen per cent
of all the sales in retail stores.' Half of the families in this
country save more than one kind of stamp, and in 1962 stamps
cost over a quarter of a million retailers between 671 and 800 mil-
lion dollars. 10
1. Hammer, Will Trading Stamps Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 16.
2. In 1914, stamps were given in six per cent of the retail stores, but after World
War I, in 1921, only 0.5 *per cent of the stores used them. Hammer, Will Trading Stamps
Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 213. In 1957, the median age for 108 stamp companies was
three to four years, only nine companies had been in operation more than twenty-five
years. 295 U.S. DEPT. or AGRICULTURE REP RT at N. (1958).
3. 295 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE REPORT 8 (1958).
4. Id. at 17.
5. Supra note 1, at 117.
6. Supra note 1, at 118.
7. Supra note 3, at 29. Cost of stamps to retailers exclusive of handling costs, average
$2.25 per 1000 stamps.
8. Supra note 1, at 118. The company will then go to the small merchants in the
area, in an attempt to build up a family of stamp givers.
9. Hammer, Will Trading Stamps Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 16.
10. Dun's Review and Modern Industry p. 49 (July 1963).
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There were approximately 250 stamp companies in 1960, dis-
tributing merchandise with a retail value of 675 million dollars
through 1600 redemption centers.11 The ten largest companies ac-
counted for seventy per cent of the business.' 2  Sperry and Hutchin-
son of New York, accounted for forty per cent of the 700 million
dollar volume that year, and today more than half of the trading
stamps saved are S. & H.'3
Stamp companies have been able to acquire net profits after
taxes of approximately six per cent as compared to three per cent
for a normal well-run department store. The reason for the high





The courts are in conflict as to the validity of legislation which
prohibits or attempts to regulate trading stamps. Much of the
confusion can be attributed to the varying weight that the courts
have assigned to the individual factors of evidence involved in
attempting to determine whether there has been a proper exercise
of the police power. Some jurisdictions have examined the nature
of each stamp plan, and often their viewpoint with respect to its
desirability has been controlling. 5 In other jurisdictions the word-
ing or application of each particular statute or ordinance has been
the determining factor.'
The history of anti-stamp legislation can be divided into four
chronological periods which are inter-related with the industry's
inception, growth and expansion. The most stamp litigation arose
in the first period, between the turn of the century and 1916. With
few exceptions the legislation involved in these early cases was
11. Hammer, Will Trading Stamps Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 117.
12. Supra note 3, at 5.
13. Supra note 11, at 117, 208. S. & H. was incorporated by the State of New Jersey
in 1900, and was licensed in forty-four states in 1956. Other major plans are Top Value
Enterprises of Dayton, Ohio; Gold Bond Stamp Company of Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Blue Chip Company in California.
14. First, in 1960, S. & H. bought 160 million dollars worth of merchandise which it
redeemed to the consumer for stamp books costing the consumer 300 million dollars. This
tremendous difference is due to the large volume and narrow variety of items the company
handles. S. & H. is one of the largest distributors of appliance and "home goods." They
have sixty-five million dollars worth of premiums in 705 redemption centers and ten
warehouses. They carry only 1500 items without advertising costs; while R. H. Macy and
Company, one of the few larger distributors, displays over 400,000 items and must pay
for advertising and promotional services. Second, not all stamps are redeemed. Estimates
vary from sixty per cent by some competitors to ninety-five by the S. & H. Company. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue allows S. & H. ninety-five per cent for tax purposes. In
1960, the Company's reserve for stamps outstanding was almost 100 million dollars.
Third the high reserves allow the Company to go into outside investments. In 1959, over
eighty million dollars was invested in cash, securities and real estate. Supra note 11, at
119, 208.
15. Linsburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 App. D.C. 512 (1897) ; Sperry &.Hutchinson
Co. v. Owensboro, 151 Ky. 389, 151 S.W. 932 (1912) ; State v. Haukins, 95 Md. 133, 51
Atl. 850 (1902).
16. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584 (1919) ; State v.
Walker, 105 La. 492, 29 So. 973 (1901).
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held unconstitutional. 1" The second period began in 1916, with three
decisions from the Supreme Court,18 and lasted for three years
during which a limited number of courts followed the high court's
rationale.19
For the next forty-two years not a single prohibitive statute
was upheld, although the general power of the legislature to act
was recognized in some instances, 20 and a regulatory statute was
upheld.2' The last quarter of this period, beginning in the early
1950's, witnessed a great boom in the stamp industry22 so the legis-
latures were again flooded with anti-stamp proposals. Few of these
proposals were enacted, and only two of those that were survived
litigation in the courts.23  Attempts to enlist federal aid were also
unsuccessful. 24  In 1961, the Montana court struck down an anti-
stamp act,25 but an act was finally upheld in Wyoming2 6 and Kan-
sas followed Wyoming's lead in 1963.27 Also, in 1961 an act which
regulated stamps through a licensing and bonding scheme was
upheld by a United States District Court in California.2 8
The first attempts to prohibit trading stamps began before
the first stamp company had been formed.29  They were based on
the existing general statutes which prohibited other specific prac-
17. Between 1888 and 1915 the validity of anti-trading stamp legislation was tested
in seventeen states and the District of Columbia. Only Alabama, Gamble v. City Council of
Montgomery, 147 Ala. 682, 39 So. 353 (1905) ; the District of Columbia, Matter of
Gregory, 219 U.S. 210 (1911) ; Washington, State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 140 Pac. 918
(1914) ; and West Virginia, Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Melton, 69 W. Va. 124, 71 S.E. 19
(1911); held such legislation valid.
18. Fast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916) ; Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369
(1916); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1916).
19. State v. Crosby Bros. Merchantile Co., 103 Kan. 733, 176 Pac. 321 (1918) ; State
v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (1917) ; State v. Underwood, 139 La. 288, 71 So.
513 (1916) ; State v. J. M. Seney Co., 134 Md. 437, 107 At]. 189 (1917) ; Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co. v. Weigle, 169 Wis. 562, 173 N.W. 315 (1919) ; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle,
166 Wis. 613, 166 N.W. 54 (1918). Cf. Olson v. Ross, 39 N.D. 372, 167 N.W. 385 (1918)
(held a proper object of police power, but the statute did not include stamps redeemable
in cash).
20. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584 (1919) ; People v.
Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939) ; People v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 179 Mich.
532, 164 N.W. 503 (1917). Cf. United Cigar Stores v. Stewart, 144 Ga. 724, 87 S.E. 1034
(1916).
21. Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737 (1941).
22. 295 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE REPORT 2 (1958). From 1948, to 1955, the industry
expanded from 150 to an estimated 370 companies.
23. Ibid. During 1957, approximately 100 bills were proposed in thirty-five oT the
forty-three state legislatures in session that year. Only four were enacted and of these
only Kansas prohibited the use of trading stamps.
24. Supra note 22.
25. Garden Spot Market, Inc. v. Byrne, 141 Mont. 382, 378 P.2d 220 (1963). The court
held that an imposition of a license which was prohibitive in nature (100- dollars tax plus
two per cent of the total gross receipts)i on a private purpose, while exempting whole-
salers was unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination violating the due process and
equal protection clauses of the state constitution.
26. Steffey v. City of Casper, 358 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1961). The court accepter the anti-
stamp argument that mechant after merchant was parctically coerced into buying
the stamps in order to compete. Since Wyoming was a fair trade state, the court held
stamp legislation was a logical extension of the state's economic legislation, and within
the scope of the police power, it had no choice but to apply a presumption of constitu-
tionality to the statute.
27. Cushenbery v. Shanahan, 190 Kan. 720, 378 P.2d 69 (1963). The court upheld the
1957 statute, making it a misdemeanor to issue stamps redeemable in either merchandise
or cash; while exempting packers and manufacturers.
28. Blue & Gold Stamps---U-Save Premium Co. v. Sobieski, 190 F..Supp. 133 (S.D. Cal.
1961)
29. Hammer, Will Trading Stamps Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1962, p. 119. Sperry & Hutch-
inson Co., founded in 1896, is the oldest trading stamp company.
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tices such as lotteries or gift enterprises.3 5 Almost without excep-
tion, the courts held that these acts were intended to prohibit only
schemes involving gambling, chance or lotteries and not trading
stamps.3 ' If the statute specifically listed trading stamps, that
provision was an unreasonable and arbitrary classification which
violated the equality provisions of the state constitutions.
3 2
Specific legislation designed to prohibit trading stamps was then
enacted, but nearly all of these statutes were struck down on the
ground that their unreasonable classification exceeded the power
of the state, violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the federal constitution and similar clauses of the state consti-
tutions.3 3 States also passed excessive tax or license fees applicable
to trading stamp companies and the retail stores issuing them,
but the courts almost unanimously held that these classifications
were arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory.
3 4
The validity of anti-stamp legislation was finally tested in 1916
before the United States Supreme Court in Rast v. Van Deman
& Lewis Co.3 5 and two companion cases, Tanner v. Little,38 and
Pitney v. Washington.3 7 In these cases the Court held that a Florida
statute imposing a prohibitive tax upon merchants issuing trading
stamps and a Washington statute imposing a 6,000 dollar annual
license fee did not violate the due process, equal protection or the
contract clauses of the United States Constitution, and was within
the police power of the State. The Court, in the Rast decision,
noted that the power to regulate conduct and contracts, upon the
basis of the public welfare, is not subject to judicial review unless
the legislation is "unreasonable or purely arbitrary," 8 and con-
cluded that:
[W]hether the use of such coupons and stamps can or
cannot be called a lottery, it is still within the power of
30. City of Winston v. Beeson, 135 N.C. 271, 47 S.E. 457 (1904) ; People v. Gillson,
109 N.Y. 389, 17 N.E. 343 (1888) International Trading-Stamp Co. v. City of Memphis,
101 Tenn. 181, 47 S.W. 136 (1898). Contra, Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 App.
D.C. 512 (1897).
31. District of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App. D.C. 253 (1910); Lansburg v. District of
Columbia, 11 App. D.C. 512 (1897). Matter of Gregory, 219 U.S. 210 (1911), held that
the District of Columbia's Act was not too vague to be enforceable. This statute encom-
passed much more than most of the laws of this nature, and prohibited an article or
thing in consideration for a purchase.
32. Supra note 30. These cases were decided on one of two issues. (1) Did the legis-
lation intend to prohibit trading stamps, and if so (2) was such inclusion beyond the
police power of the state?
33. Territory v. M. A. Gunst & Co., 18 Hawaii 196 (1907) ; In re Opinion of Justices,
226 Mass. 613, 115 N.E. 978, (1917) (Advisory opinion given by Mass. Supreme Judicial
Court) ; People v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich. 532, 164 N.W. 503 (1917) ; State v
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 94 Neb. 785, 144 N.W. 795 (1913) ; State v. Ramseyer, 73 N.HL
31, 50 Atl. 958 (1904).
-34. City Council of Montgomery v. Kelly, 142 Ala. 552, 38 So. 67 (1965); Ex parte
McKenna, 126 Cal. 429, 58 Pac. 916 (1899); Hewin v. City of Atlanta, 121 Ga. 723, 38
So. 67 (1905); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. City of Owensboro, 151 Ky. 389, 151 S.W.
932 (1912) ; O'Keefe v. City of Somerville, 190 Mass. 110, 76 N.E. 457 (1906).
35. 240 U.S. 842 (1916).
36. 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
37. 240 U.S. 387 (1916).
38. Supra note 35, at 342. The court pointed out that it is the legislatures duty, to
"discern and correct evils, not only of definite Injury, but also such as are obstacles to
greater public welfare if within legislative authority; as is the use of such coupons and
stamps."
NOTES
the legislature to consider it as having similar evils; and
the regulation thereof by the legislature is not to be im-
peached and overruled by the courts on the account of
difference of opinion in regard to the conclusion reached.3 9
Noting its position was contrary to the large majority of state court
decisions, the Court commented that, in many instances, the legis-
lature should be the conclusive judge as to prohibitive legislation.40
When a state constitution embodies clauses substantially similar
to those of the federal constitution, such as the due process or
equal protection clauses, the Supreme Court's interpretation should
be "highly persuasive" but it is not controlling on the state court's
interpretation of its constitution.4 1  The impact of these decisions
on state courts was not wide-spread, and by 1919 there were only
seven decisions in five states which adopted the Supreme Court's
rationale.4
2
Other areas which produced a large amount of litigation were
the fair trade acts, resale price maintenance and below cost stat-
utes which became popular in the 1930's. Most of these statutes
were designed to eliminate other competitive practices and did
not explicitly cover the use of trading stamps. 43 The issue here
was whether the use of stamps constituted an illegal price reduction
or whether it was a part of the cost of doing business included
in the statutory markup; and if it was the former, did the legisla-
ture intend the act to apply to stamps, and if so, was it a constitutional
use of the police power?" The majority of cases have held that
39. Supra note 35, at 343, 365. The court rejected the contention that stamp giving was
but a means of advertising, and a method of allowing a cash discount. In rejecting the
argument that the stamp plans could carry no inherent evil, the court noted, "Advertising
. . . is merely identification and description . . . appraising of quality and space ....
The schemes of complainants have no such directness and effect. They rely upon something
else than the article sold. They tempt by Promise of value, greater than that article and
apparently not represented in its price, and it hence may be thought that thus by an
appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence."
40. Rast v. Van Denam & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 364-366 (1916). "In such differ-
ences between judicial and legislative opinion where should the choice be? . . . Regarding
the number of cases only, they constitute a body of authority from which there might
well be hesitation to dissent except upon clear compulsion. The foundation of all of
them is that the schemes detailed are based on inviolatable right, that they are but the
exercise of a personal liberty . . . that in them there is no element of chance or any-
thing detrimental to the Public welfare. But there may be partial or total dispute of the
propositions. And It can be urged that the reasoning upon which they are based regards
the mere mechinism of the schemes alone and does not give enough force to their . . .
insidious potentualities. As to all of which not courts but legislatures may be the best
Judges and, it may be, the conclusive judges. . . . Certainly . .. [their] judgment is not
impeached by urging against it a difference of opinion. . . . And it is not required that
we should be sure as to the precise reasons for such judgment or that we should certain-
ly know them or be convinced of the wisdom of the legislation.•'
41. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 180-, 122 N.E. 584 (1919) ; Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 925, 65 N.W.2d 410, 423 (1954) (dissenting opinion)
People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939).
42. State v. Crosby Bros. Mercantile Co., 103 Kan. 733, 176 Pac. 231 (1918); State
V. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (1917); State v. Underwood, 139 La. 288, 71 So.513 (1916); State v. J. M. Seney Co., 134 Md. 437, 107 Atl. 189 (1917) Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle, 169 Wis. 562, 173 N.W. 315 (1919); Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
v. Weigle, 166 Wis. 613, 166 N.W. 54 (1918). Cf. Olson v. Ross, 39 N.D. 372, 167 N.W.
385 (1918) (held a proper object of police power, but the statute did not include stamps
redeemable in cash). This line of cases proceeds on the concept that the police power is
no longer limited by the simple purposes of public safety, health and morals, but extends
to the entire field of "common welfare, convenience or prosperity."
43. See Food & Groercy Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942) ; Bristol-
Myers Co. V. Lit Bros. Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
44. Ibid.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
stamps do not violate these acts because stamps are a discount
for cash and not a price reduction; or the acts or their application
to stamps are unconstitutional; or because the intent to injure
competition had not been established.4 5 Two states have even at-
tempted, without success, to base stamp prohibition on securities
("Blue Sky") acts and antimonopoly acts.
46
Regulatory legislation in this area has met with more favorable
results as the stamp industry has expanded.
Wisconsin and Washington require that stamps be redeem-
able in cash only. Since 1958, laws have been enacted in
California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico and Vermont, which require
registration of trading stamp companies, disclosures of basic
information about their operation and financial condition,
a bond to insure redemption and that stamps show a cash
value and be optionally redeemable at that value. With the
exception of the bond, these regulations also apply in Maine.
Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota and Ohio
require an optional redemption and ... Utah requires a bond.
These regulatory schemes, which have been tested, have
been held constitutional.
4 7
Probably the most novel attempt to regulate trading stamps to
the extent of practical prohibition is an effort to claim the un-
redeemed stamps for the state under escheat laws. To date the
theory has been tested in only one state, and the New Jersey court
rejected it."
8
Trading Stamps and the State Police Power
Although in an overwhelming majority of cases courts struck
down legislation prohibiting trading stamps, the validity of such
legislation under the state police power is still open to question.
In a substantial number of the cases litigated, the courts have
either generally recognized or not answered the question of whether
the legislature has the right to enact such legislation even though
the particular statute was struck down.4 9 Many of the decisions
specifically holding that such legislation is beyond the scope of
the police power were decided prior to 1916 and prior to the Supreme
45. Ibid. Contra, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 221, 148
N.E.2d 861 (1958).
46. Merchant's Legal Stamp Co. v. Murphy, 220 Mass. 281, 107 N.E. 968 (1915)
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 266 P.2d 501 (1951).
47. 10 KAN. L. REv. 456, 457 (1962).
48. State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 59 N.J. 154, 157 A.2d 505 (1960). The court
held that the evidence was Insufficient to specifically identify the property and without
this the property could not be subject to escheate.
49. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584 (1919); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 925, 65 N.W.2d 410 (1954); People v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich. 532, 164 N.W. 503 (1917); State v. Hoitgreve, 58 Utah 563,
200 Pac. 894 (1921). Cf. Opinion of Justices, 226 Mass. 613, 115 N.E. 978 (1917).
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Court decisions.50 Also, decisions subsequently voiding this type of
legislation did so on the basis of precedents set prior to the Supreme
Court decisions.51 The bulk of these statutes were held void due
to exemptions which were held to be discriminatory classifications.2
Finally, these cases were determined under a concept of a strictly
limited police power. Since then the judicial philosophies concern-
ing the review of economic and social legislation have been consider-
ably liberalized with a greater legislative freedom in classification,
which should gradually be reflected in state court decisions.5
CONCLUSION
Due to its phenomenal growth in the past ten years, the trading
stamp industry has become a major, if not a paramount, factor in
directing consumer patronage.5 As the market becomes saturated
the paradox arises, that as the consumer seems to become more
enchanted with stamps the retailer grows more disenchanted.
Although stamps are merely a business device to retailers,
their effect on consumers is much more complex, and the knowledge
that prices are raised to cover their cost does not seem to dis-
illusion the average stamp consumer.5 5  To many it is an easy
way to save, and some motivational researchers feel their appeal
lies in that they allow the housewife to get small appliances, house-
wares and luxuries that she would not buy if she had to pay cash.5
On the other hand most plans cost the average supermarket
two per cent of its annual volume and close to three per cent
of that of smaller businesses, such as dry cleaners, drug stores and
gasoline stations, due fo their lower volume.57  When the stamp
50. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 925, 65 N.W.2d 410, 422 (1954)
(dissenting opinion).
51. City & County of Denver v. United Cigar Stores Co., 68 Colo. 363, 189 Pac. 848
(1920) ; People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939).
52. People v. Zimmerman, 102 App. Div. 103, 92 N.Y.S. 497 (1905) ; State v. Dalton,
22 R. 77, 46 Atl. 234 (1900); State v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197, 56 Atl. 983 (1904).
53. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Nebbla v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
54. In 1962, seventy-seven per cent of all supermarkets offered stamps and they ac-
counted for seventy-five per cent of the nation's food bill. See The Great Supermarket
Profit Squeeze: Relief In 1964?, Forbes, Feb. 1964, p. 22. Food stores, drugstores and
gasoline stations comprise seventy per cent of the stamp business. Forty per cent of the
grocery stores handle stamps. This includes the ten largest chain stores. See Hammer,
Will Trading Stamps Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 116.
55. A survey in 1962, by Progressive Grocers Magazine In co-operation with Colonial
Stores (eleventh largest food chain) revealed the following: stamp savers could be placed
in three catagorles, (1) eager, ten per cent; (2) interested, thirty-five per cent; (3) in-
different, fifty-five per cent. Fifty-five per cent saved two types of stamps, twelve per
cent three types, sixty-eight per cent did not exactly know what premiums they were
saving for, but the same per cent preferred merchandise redemption instead of cash.
Fifty-one per cent preferred fifty extra stamps to a reduction of five cents less per item.
The helpful friendly store personnel was the main reason seventy-three per cent of the
consumers shopped at a particular market. Fifty-two per cent, because of wide selection,
fifty Per cent wanted stamps, forty-four per cent, the meats; thirty-six per cent the
produce and in eighteen per cent of the cases the price was the reason. See Advertising
Age, Oct. 1963, p. 1O.
56. To illustrate: A wife wants a new electric appliance, but it costs $28.98. If she
Is on a budget she finds It difficult to purchase the item. But a slight increase in the
food bill, to take advantage of the stamps will not be questioned and she will have pro-
vided herself with a means to procure the item. See The Great Supermarket Profit
Squeeze: Relief In 1964?, Forbes, Feb. 1964, p. 22.
57. 295 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE REPORT at iv. (1958). Cost of stamps to retailers
exclusive of handling costs, average two dollars and twenty-five cents per 1000 stamps.
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plan is no longer able to increase a retailer's volume by fifteen
per cent, which is the minimum increase necessary for the plan
to pay for itself, he must simply tack the two per cent on to his
operating costs. Since this is roughly the percentage of his profit,
normally the consumer will have to share the burden through an
increase in prices~5 Stamps are now the second largest expense
item of most supermarkets' operating cost 59 (fourteen per cent).
In the past, attempts to prohibit the use of stamps have not
survived legal tests except in Kansas, Wyoming and the District
of Columbia, yet all but six of the fifty states have attempted to
place some type of restriction on them.60 Attempts to restrict
the use of stamps have been more successful, but have been mainly
minor in character and not of sufficient severity to seriously hamper
the industry.,'
Efforts to control the use of stamps have increased with the
industry's growth and it can be safely said that they will continue
to intensify. In light of the wide-spread effect the industry now
has on so many people in almost every state, it is submitted that
state courts will eventually recognize the right of the legislatures
under the police power to more effectively regulate if not prohibit
stamps. Initially strictly prohibitive criminal statutes would seem
to have the best chance to survive constitutional attacks before
state courts, and would be upheld upon federal appeal.6 2 But this
process would indeed be a slow one, and it seems more likely that
prior to that time, the economics of competition rather than legal
control will decide the future role of trading stamps.63
In the last analysis the consumer will be the deciding factor.
This seems to be true in North Dakota as elsewhere. In Olson
58. 295 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE REPORT 28 (1958). This study indicated that the
average prices paid by consumers in stamp stores was 0.6 per cent higher than non-stamp
stores, which equaled only about thirty per cent of the average merchandise value of the
stamps. As the market is more highly saturated the cost of prices in stamp stores should
go up, due to the less probable volume increase necessary to offset the cost. Hammer,
Wil Trading Stamps Stick, Fortune, Aug. 1960, p. 116. In 1960, retailers paid over 600
million dollars for stamps, and R. M. Loverty, Sr., Chairman of Thriftimart, and the
guiding hand behind Blue Chip stamps stated, "Don't kid yourself, the customer has to
pay for the stamps." In 1964, with the retail cost near 800 million dollars, with seventy-
seven per cent of all supermarkets offering them, Sidney R. Robb, Chairman of the Stop
and Shop food chain, remarked, "They don't really bring in any more business, they
simply force you to boost prices." A & P, the largest food chain in the country, was
forced to raise prices by three per cent to four per cent in 1963. The Great Supermarket
Profit Squeeze: Relief In 1964?, Forbes, Feb. 1964, p. 22.
59. Ibid.
60. Only Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina and Texas have not
passed some type of anti-stamp legislation.
61. In the great majority of jurisdictions the only restrictions which have survived
judicial review are: (1) a cash value must be stated on the face of each stamp; (2)
stamps must be redeemed in cash (explicitly or at the option of the owner) ; (3) reason-
able tax or licenses can be levied.
62. Under this approach there would be less possibility of having a statute voided due
to wording or application. The only issue before the court would be whether it was a
proper exercise of police power.
63. A recent survey of supermarkets indicated a drop from seventy-seven per cent to
seventy per cent of members giving stamps in the past year. See Brown, Sperry & Hutch-
inson's Very Successful Stagnation, Fortune, Nov. 1964, p. 256. In North Dakota, some
communities have banned trading stamps and others have initiated their own stamp plans.
See Grand Forks Herald, Feb. 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 2.
370
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v. Ross,6" the court held that the state's Trading Stamp Act did not
prohibit or regulate the sale of trading stamps redeemable only
in cash.65 Since such a plan was being contested, the action was
dismissed without deciding the constitutionality of the Act.6 In
dictum the court did seem to approve the Supreme court's rationale
in Rast v Van Deman.6 7  In 1955, the legislature passed an act
which also prohibited stamps redeemable in cash, but before it
could be tested in the courts, it was defeated in a referendum by
almost a two to one vote.
68
If the retailers in this state are unable to find a solution among
themselves and are unable to induce the consumers to change
their minds or offer them a comparative substitute, restrictive if
not prohibitive legislation is likely to be initiated again. If the
consumer again rejects the statute, federal intervention may be the
only avenue of control remaining.89
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64. 39 N.D. 372, 167 N.W. 385 (1918).
65. I. at 387.
66. Ibid.
67. Id. at 386.
68. The statute authorized each county in the state to levy a 6000 dollar license fee
upon any stamp company operating within county lines. N.D. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 302, §
2. The statute was submitted to a referendum on November 6, 1956, and was defeated
by a vote of 160,344 to 83,159. N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 394.
69. Between 1917 and 1954, the trading stamp issue was brought before the Federal
Trade Commission six times and during 1956 and 1957, it conducted investigations to
determine whether certain stamp companies were operating in violation of the Federal
Trade Act or Clayton Act. The Commission left the door open to proof of specific violations
as to unfair methods of competition, but at this time did not hold trading stamps them-
selves unlawful. See 295 U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE REPORT 12 (1958).
